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Abstract
In the basic game of trust a first mover can decide between competition
or trust in the other's willingness to respond in kind. Whereas the game
ends in case of competition, the second mover can react to trustful
cooperation by exploiting the first mover or by dividing the rewards
evenly. Whereas the game theoretic solution predicts competition, one
evolutionary analysis proves the evolution of a sufficiently strong con-
science guaranteeing cooperation. If, however, the feeling of guilt is
private information, the only evolutionarily stable result implies a non-
preventive conscience and correspondingly an inefficient payoff vector.
We finally discuss the possibility of investing in a perfect detection
technology where two evolutionary stable situations can coexist, one
relying on competition as well as non-monomorphic composition of the
population.
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Competition or Co-operation
On the evolutionary economics of trust, exploitation and moral attitudes
"For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will
performe after; because the bonds of words aze too weak to bridle
mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feaze
of some coercive Power; which in the condition ofineer Nature,
where all men aze equall, and judges of the justness of their own
feazs cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which
performeth first, does but betray himselfe ..." (Hobbes, Leviathan,
chap. 14)
Human beings are endowed with foresight and understanding. They can
form models of the world and anticipate future causal effects of their
actions. Knowing that their fellows command the same faculties of the
mind humans can behave strategically rational. On the other hand,
emotions and passions may interfere with the precepts of reason and
thus harm long run interests. Classical philosophers have discussed this
quite extensively as "mnflict between reason and passion". More recently
economists revived the old philosophical insight that "harmful"
emotions can be "checked" by beneficial ones. They pointed out that the
emotions may adopt a strategic role that can further rather than harm
individuals' long run interests (cf. Frank 1987~88). In pazticulaz they can
serve as "guarantors of promises" (cf. Hirshleifer 1987) and thus render
subgame perfect (cf. Selten 1965, 1975) equilibria of strategic interaction
which could not be reached by forward looking (incrementally) rational
choices.
Subsequently we shall focus on an elementary but fundamentally
important class of social interactions to which we shall refer as "games of
trust". In such situations a second moving individual can exploit a first
mover's trustful co-operative behavior. If the first mover must suspect
that the second mover behaves "competitively" rather than co-2
operatively in games of trust the first mover shall not trust and a Pazeto-
inefficient result shall emerge. But mutually beneficial co-operation and
a Pareto-efficient result become viable if first moving individuals can
rationally expect that second movers are endowed with sufficiently
strong moral attitudes like retributive emotions supporting a"sense of
justice or fairness".
Describing this strategic role or function of emotions in furthering co-
operation is of considerable interest in itself (cf. for a philosophical
account of the decisive role of retributive emotions within any viable
system of morals Mackie 1985). But it does not explain how the emotions
could evolve and can prevail among human beings. Quite to the
contrary competition between biological organisms in the Hobbesian
jungle does not seem to leave clearance for the evolution of moral
attitudes or, for that matter, a conscience. Indeed, ever since Darwin
there was a general suspicion that the struggle for reproductive success
must drive out or, more precisely, must have driven out any non-
competitive dispositions. Philosophers like, most prominently Nietzsche,
wondered how such a phenomenon like a conscience could emerge and
survive in inter-individual competition. Even nowadays and regazdless
of our knowledge of such concepts like kin selection (cf. Maynard Smith
1964 and with respect to humans Alexander 1978) it may seem quite
obvious -- at least at first sight -- that a monomorphic population of
trustworthy individuals cannot be evolutionarily stable since it can be
successfully invaded by a non-trustworthy mutant.
According to this view it should be expected that human individuals are
not naturally endowed with a preference for fair retribution of trustful
co-operative acts of their fellows. Biological competition should have
"programmed" human actors to behave competitively in the sense of
exploiting trustful behavior of their fellow humans. Social co-operation
should not be viable unless some external coercive power interferes.
However, such a Hobbesian view of social co-operation not only leaves
us with the so-called "Hobbesian problem of social order" (cf. Parsons
1968) - in particular the problem of how to explain co-operation in3
creating the external coercive power itself - it is also not in line with our
general experience (cf. also the classical statement in Kropotkin 1902).
For, evidently, besides those who exploit others there are at least some
individuals who are at least sometimes trustworthy and in fact are
willing to retribute fairly even though they could act differently.
In this paper we shall try to reach a somewhat deeper understanding of
how and to what extent moral attitudes supporting co-operative
behavior in "games of trust" might conceivably have evolved. In
particular we address the issue of evolutionary stability of retributive
emotions facilitating co-operation among rational actors. First, some
elementary concepts of evolutionary game theory aze sketched (1.). Then
the "game of trust" is formally introduced (2.). In a third step this two
person extensive game is analyzed from an evolutionary point of view
(cf. for former applications of basically the same methods to other social
settings Giith 1991, Giith and Yaari 1992). It is shown that retributive
emotions can prevail in evolutionarily stable ways if players know
beforehand whether or not the other player is endowed with a
"(sufficiently strong) conscience" (3.1). On the other hand developing a
"(sufficiently strong) conscience" shall not be evolutionarily stable if
individuals, though knowing the distribution of types in the population,
cannot identify the type of the other player before playing the game of
trust (3.2). Afterwards our analysis of the foregoing two polaz or extreme
cases is extended to an intermediate case in which specific information
about the type of the other player is available at a cost (3.3.). Some final
observations and a general discussion of results conclude the paper (4.).
1. Basic Concepts of Evolutionary Theory
To put it very succinctly theories of biological evolution study the
competition between alternative "genetic endowments" in a gene pool.
Success is measured in terms of the relative frequency of genes. The so
called "replicator dynamics" which determine relative frequencies in the4
process of biological reproduction are quite well understood and can be
described by "replicator equations".
More specifically, assume that M is a one dimensional "mutant space" -
for convenience a subset of the real numbers ~ït - and me M some
mutant. Let the density function ft: M-~ [0,1] characterize for each teT
the relative frequencies for all mutants me M by ft(m). If the mutant m is
matched with a competitor m'E M the relative fitness of m against m' is
measured by H(m, m'. The equation
(2.1) Ht(m) - j H(m, m' ft(m' dm'
M
characterizes the relative reproductive success of ine M(reproductive
success related to all m'E M and their frequency distribution in the gene
pool); while
(2.2) Ht - ( Ht(rn) ft(m) dm
is the average relvproductive success of all mutants in period t.
According to the replicator equation
(2.3) ft(m) - ft(m) [Ht(m)-Ht],
which complies with the requirement fM ft(m) dm - 0 for transforming
one density function into another one, the mutant meM can be relatively
more successful in a population provided that it exists at all in the
population at t, i.e. ft(m)~0, and that it has more than average
reproductive success, i.e. Ht(m)-Ht ~ 0.
In what follows we will confine ourselves basically to a static
chazacterization of the stability of the results of evolutionary processes in
terms of evolutionarily stable strategies, ESS and, for that matter, to the
closely related concept of limit evolutionarily stable strategies, LESS. The
concept of an LESS introduced in Selten (1988) is broader than the
original notion of an ESS (cf. Maynard Smith and Price 1973) in that5
every ESS is a LESS but not vice versa. Though the concept of an ESS is
not always compatible with the stability of the replicator dynamics (cf.
Weissing, 1991) the two stability concepts will be equivalent in the
specific cases that we study.
Referring to the notation introduced in equations (2.1)-(2.3) a mutant or
strategy mE M can be characterized as evolutionarily stable by
(2.4) H(m, m) ? H(m', m), t~ m'e M
and
(2.5) H(m, m' ~ H(m', m', tl m'E M with H(m, m) - H(m', m).
According to the first condition (2.4) an evolutionarily stable strategy is
adapted optimally to an m-monomorphic environment in so far as the
reproductive success of m in a population consisting entirely of m-
individuals is at least as high as that of any other strategy m'e M. Should
some other mutant or strategy m'E M be as well adapted as m in an m-
monomorphic population m' nevertheless cannot succeed. For, accor-
ding to (2.5) m will have greater reproductive success than m' in an m'-
monomorphic as well as in any population composed exclusively of m
and m` individuals.
The systematic relationship between the concept of an ESS and stable
situations that are characterized by a distribution f(.) with ft(m)-0 for all
me M is quite obvious. If f~(m)-0 holds good for all me M then according
to equation (2.3) all mutants or strategies m with ft(m)~0 must have the
same reproductive success. If several strategies are optimal the process
characterized by (2.3) would reduce the frequency of all strategies m'
because according to (2.5) these strategies would fare relatively worse in
every population exclusively composed of m and m' individuals.6
2. The game of trust
So called paradoxes of co-operation and rationality have been wídely
discussed in social theory (cf. for instance anthologies like Barry and
Hardin, 1981 or Campbell and Sowden 1985). The prisoner's dilemma is
certainly the most famous example of this genre. Still, taking the
prisoner's dilemma as a pazadigm case of problematic social situations is
partly misleading (for an effort to characterize the concept of a
problematic social situation see Raub and Voss 1986 who expand on the
discussion in Harsanyi 197~. The prisoner's dilemma is constructed as a
simultaneous move game and presented in its normal form. This
somewhat distracts from the basic fact that social interaction typically is
characterized by a sequence of moves in which one player moves first
and another second. Even though in game theoretic modeling
simultaneity of moves dces not depend on the timing but rather on the
information about moves some if not the the most important problematic
real world interactions seem to differ in the latter respect from standazd
prisoner's dilemma interactions (for some related considerations, see
Bolle and Ockenfels 1990).
Anybody who has carefully watched bargaining and subsequent
exchange between children, the exchange of spies in cold waz Berlin or
the exchange of hostages knows that second or last mover advantages
are of crucial importance. Two children simultaneously grabbing for
what has been promised to them in the bargaining process, spies
"simultaneously" runnig to the other side of a Berlin bridge or releasing
hostages in the last moment in exchange for some means of escape that
are also offered in the last moment are examples that all tell the same
story: Without commitment power exchange and agreement are
precarious. If one side moves first and fulfils its promise, the other one,
now in the advantageous position of a second mover, does not have an
incentive to comply with the terms of the agreement. The execution of
acts is not completely contingent on each other and therefore Pareto
inferior results tend to emerge.One should not be mislead by the somewhat exotic character of the
fore);oing ~~xamplr5. Thc~ pmhlcmatic charartcr of social exchange and
the non-self-enforcing character of the agreements involved is most
clearly visible in such anarchic or quasi-anarchic situations. But the
underlying problem of trust and reward pervades social life throughout.
Within any legal relationship those aspects which have not been
explicitly dealt with in legally enforceable contractual clauses will tend
to give rise to these problems. Social institutions like promise giving or
contract enforcement are nothing but extended answers to such
problems. The division of labor and more generally reciprocity hinge on
solving problems of trust. In particular, individuals can speczalize only if
they can trust that the specificity of their resources will not be exploited.
And, if we follow the maximin of "do ut des" (I give to make you give)
how can we trust that the other, after we have done our part, shall do
his?
Insisting that the terms exchange and prisoner's dilemma may generally
be used interchangeably Russell Hardin alludes to the fundamental role
of trust in social interaction ( cf. Hardin 1982, and also Kliemt 1990). This
insight suggests that the problem of trust should be at center stage of
any strategic analysis of social interaction in general and social co-
operation in particular. Its essential aspects may be scrutinized by
studying the following game of trust (a variant of the stage game of
Rosenthal's, 1981, centipede game):8
The fust pay-off at each end node corresponds to the first moving player
the second to the second mover. We assume O~s~r~l and 2 ~ r(where
the second requirement is not essential for the subsequent azgument but
merely excludes cases in which optimal co-operation would require that
individuals take turns in exploiting each other). The two moves N, T of
player 1 may be interpreted as corresponding to "no trust" and "trust"
respectively. Move E refers to "exploitation" of a trusting player 1 while
R symbolizes "(fair) reward".
The parameter "m" is purely behavioral. It is interpreted as the effect of a
"conscience". It is internal to the actor rather than being influenced by
access to resources of the external world. In principle m could be any
real number. As choices depend only on the order bettiveen the pay-offs
it is sufficient, however, to study merely two values - m, m- of the
pazameter m. The relevant relation is
(2.1) m ~ r-1 ~ m.
Consider m-trvr-1. In this case, which in particular includes m-0, the
strategy combination (N, E) is the single subgame perfect equlibrium of
the game. Because of r~s playing this way is Pazeto-inefficient. On the
other hand m~r-1 implies that the single subgame perfect equilibrium of
the game is (T, R). Then both players get a payoff of r. Thus, if the rules
of the m-game are changed such that the m-game emerges both players
shall be better off. The external institutions of promise giving as well as
that of contracting may serve the purpose of modifying the preference
order of second movers. They may provide means of commitment such
that individuals can deliberately choose to modify their future
incentives. External punishment of certain acts would do either and so
will the emergence of a sufficiently strong conscience "in" the player
adopting the role of the second mover. It could also bring about such a
change of the rules. Focusing on conscience in this paper this raises the
question whether and under which circumstances a(sufficiently strong)
conscience can be expected to prevail.9
3. The evolution of a conscience
The question may be addressed within the framework of evolutionary
game theory. More specifically evolutionary stability of alternative
values of the parameter m may be determined for the most simple stra-
tegy or mutant space
(3.1) M-{m, m}.
The two strategies or mutants meM lead to two different tyqes of
players. We will refer to the m-type who is endowed with a sufficiently
strong conscience as a"player with a conscience" or the "fair player
(type)". Correspondingly the m-type will be called "player without a
conscience" or the "unfair player (type)".
Let us generally assume that fair and unfair players indefinitely interact
in games of trust. They are matched randomly and in each of the
matches they play the game independently of their memory of past or
their expectations of future interactions with either the same or other
players. Whether they adopt the role of the first or that of the second
mover is determined by a random process that is beyond their strategic
control. With probability 1~2 each of the two roles may be assigned to
them. After role assignment the players know their position in the game.
Under these general assumptions we shall subsequently study the effects
of different information conditions. We start with the assumption that
players can recognize beforehand and with certainty each other's type.
This leads to what we shall call the "evolutionary game of trust with
complete type information".10
3.1. The evolutionary game of trust with complete type information
Figure 3.1~
Analyzing the game of figure 3.1 from an evolutionary point of view we
must determine the relative fitness H(ml, m2) for all constellations of
parameters (ml, m2), ml, m2 e M-(mm}. T'his can be done on the basis
of our knowledge of solutions that will emerge in the game of trust for
different values of the parameter m(cf. figure 2.1). Given our
assumption that players can identify the other player's type with
certainty the first moving player knows the second mover's type. The
first mover knows whether or not after playing T he can rationally trust
that the second mover will retribute by the choice of R. Therefore, after
the elimination of dominated strategies, CT, R) is the solution for m-m
while (N, E) is rational for m-m. According to (T, R) the pay-off or,
biologically speaking, the reproductive success of each player is r while
it will be s for each player if (N, E) is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
The results of rational play of the game depend only on the type of the
second mover. Each player, regardless of her type, will be in that
1 Neither in this graph nor subsequently shall we distinguish explicitly between eyuivalent moves like
T, N indifferent subgames though they are, of murse, different moves. Since the disdnction is obvious
anyway this notational simplification will not lead tomnfusions.11
position with probability 1 ~2. Therefore we can easily calculate the
expected reproductive success of the fair and unfair types of players. The
results of the calculations for the four parameter constellations are








The entries in the table represent expected reproductive success.
Focusing on the row player - entries in the upper left corner of each cell -
we may observe that independently of whether m2 - m or m2- mholds
good the fair type of player 1 shall fare better than the unfair type.
Because of r~s the reproducrive success of player 1 shall be greater under
ml - m than under m1- m. Thisproves
Theorem 3.1: There is exactly one evolutionarily stable strategy in the
evolutionary game of trust with complete type infor-
mation, namely m.
Starting with any population that contains both types the m-type will
eventually eliminate the m-type provided that players, who happen to
be in the first mover position, can identify the other player's type. We
may infer therefore from theorem 3.1 that the genetic disposition to
develop a sufficiently strong conscience will pay off in the currency of
reproductive success if complete type information prevails. Under such
ideal information conditions (cf. the related assumption of "trans-12
parency" in Gauthier 1986,174) only the "moral" geno-type can persist in
evolution.
The foregoing argument amounts to a rudimentary (potential)
evolutionary explanation of how and why a conscience could evolve
under ideal information conditions.z We now turn to the polar case in
which players cannot identify the their partner's type beforehand. To
this case we will refer as the "evolutionary game of trust with incomplete
type information".
3.2. The evolutionary game of trust with incomplete type information
That players can identify each other's type with certainty may be
assumed with some plausibility only in small closely knit societies or,
more generally, small stable groups (which of course may be part of
larger organizations). However under such conditions our general
assumption of random matching of players without memory and
reputation effects becomes quite implausible. In particular, players
should be expected to choose their partners for the game of trust
according to their type information whenever possible. If we take into
account this the assumption of random matching fits much better with a
process of anonymous interaction of a large number of players.
Interaction on a large anonymous market would form a typical example.
But then it becomes much more plausible to start from the premise that
type information is lacking. This quite naturally leads to the assumption
that players know the distribution of types in the entire population but
do not have any information about the type of their partner.
In our analysis of this case we shall assume more specifically that players
do not know the type of their partner if they have to decide between N
Z Even if the play of (T, R) would mnsume some resources the same result muld be reached. Observe
that the reproductive success of the~-type in any case exceeds that of the rfi-type by Z. Within the
clearance left by Zs ~ 0 only the critical value of the parameter would change. Foradditional costs of
}u0 the requirement for a sufficient strengthofthe conscience m would turn into ltpl~r-{l.13
and T. Given that p, OSp51, denotes the share of m-types in the entire
population and 1-p accordingly the shaze of m-types, we assume that the
belief parameters p and 1-p are common knowledge. Moreover each
player knows his own type or his own pazameter meM.
Figure 3.3
Figure 3.3. represents the evolutionary game of trust with incomplete
type information. At the start of the game nature as the player numbered
0 makes three random moves. Firstly the type of player 1, secondly the
type of player 2 and thirdly the roles of first and second mover are
determined randomly. For convenience we have collapsed the random
determination of types into one initial random move. With probability
1 ~2 and independently of their type players will get into the position of
first or second mover. Afterwards players make their moves under
common knowledge of p but ignorant of each others' type. The optimal
decisions of the second mover do not depend on the type of the first
mover. Thus the second mover's information sets become strategically14
irrelevant and can therefore be neglected in the graphic presentation of
the game.
The information sets of first moving players who are deciding between
N and T are symbolized by dotted braids. Deciding whether "to trust or
not to trust" the first mover does not know the type of the second mover.
For instance, if a fair type player 1 is assigned the role of a first mover he
only knows that he is at one of the left decision nodes which aze reached
with probability p2 and p(1-p), respectively. Obviously, these
probabilities determine the posteriori beliefs of the first mover in an
unambigous way: the m-type is expected with probability p while the m-
type is expected with complementary probability (1-p). For a first
moving player 1 who is of the unfair type the corresponding
probabilities are (1-p)p and (1-p)2. Analogous considerations apply if
player 2 is the first mover while player 1 moves second.
Neglecting the information sets of the second mover as strategically
irrelevant we can anticipate her optimal decisions, R for m-m and E for
m-m. This leads to the truncated game tree of figure 3.4.15
Analyzing this tree the expected reproductive success of the mutants m,
m e M can be determined in a fairly simple way. We note first, that indi-
viduals who end up as a first mover will independently of their own
type choose N if s~rp f 0(1-p) and T if s~rp f 0(1-p). Pursuing this line of
argument somewhat further we can generally distinguish two cases:
rp~s and rp~s.
If rp~s holds good the following two relations determine the expected
reproductive success of the two types
1 1 1
(3.1) 2[pr f(1-p)0] f 2 r - 2(prfr) for m-m
1 1 1
and (3.2) 2[pr f(1-p)0] f 21 - 2(prtl) for m-m.
Consider, for instance, the left side of relation (3.1). With probability 1~2
a player of type m will be assigned the role of a first mover. Because of
rp~s, he will choose T then. With probability p the second mover will be
of type J too. This type will fairly reward trust by move R.
Consequently the first mover shall receive r with probability p. With
probability (1-p) the second mover will be of the unfair type. Trust shall
be met with exploitation, E, and therefore will yield 0 for the first mover.
With probability 1~2 the m-type will play the game as a second mover.
As the first mover independently of his own type will choose T if rp~s
prevails the m-type who prefers R to E can expect r. A completely
parallel argument can be used in interpreting relation (3.2). This
concludes the analysis of case r~ps.
If rp~s holds good the first mover shall independently of her type choose
N. There will be no second move and the pay-offs for both types of
players shall be s inthis case.
Since r~l the value determined in (3.2) is larger than the one determined
in (3.1). Thus the expected reproductive success of m in an m-
monomorphic population is larger than that of m. An m-monomorphic16
population is not evolutionarily stable and neither is any population
with p~ r. This discussion is summed up by
Theorem 3.2: In the evolutionary game of trust with incomplete type
information no population composition with a shaze p~ r
of fair m-types can be evolutionazily stable.
Theorem 3.2 states that in any population composed exclusively of fair
types the unfair types would have a higher reproductive success once
they enter the population. Still, once the percentage p of individuals of
type m shrinks to some value lower than r there would be no
evolutionary pressure in favor of unfair types anymore. First movers
would choose N all the time. The fact that fair types prefer R over E
would become irrelevant. Beyond the threshold r the disposition to
behave fairly would not be weeded out.
However, the absence of evolutionary pressure presupposes that players
can behave in ways that perfectly comply with the precepts of rational
choice. In a complex world in which phenotypes must pursue complex
behavioral programs it may be more adequate to assume that
individuals regardless of their faculty to choose rationally (a biological
endowment as well) will make slight mistakes or non-rational choices
once in a while. Under this assumption we can strengthen the concept of
an ESS to that of a limit evolutionazily stable strategy (LESS; cf. Selten
1988) which captures the notion of slight mistakes by the mathematical
idea of probabilistic perturbations.
According to these perturbations even those moves that rationally
would be performed with probability 0 shall be performed with some
sufficiently small probability e~0. Evolutionary stability of such per-
turbed games of trust can be studied and the limit e-~0 can be taken.
Again it is helpful to distinguish between the two cases rp~s and rp~s.17
In case rp~s the relation (3.2)~(3.1) will hold good in perturbed games.
The difference in reproductive success will not be compensated by small
perturbations. Therefore reproductive success will be type dependent in
(slightly) perturbed games. Minimum probabilities for E and R would
merely narrow the scope for the population composition p.
In case rp~s expectations were not type dependent in the unperturbed
game. However in the perturbed game expectations become type
dependent.
Let e be a small, but positive minimum probability for T as a first
mover's choice. We get
(3.3) 2[(1-e) s f e rp] f 2[(1-s) s t re] for m-m
and
(3.4) 2[(1-e) s f e rp] f 2[(1-e) s f le] for m- in.
If they aze assigned to the role of a first mover both types have the same
expectations. For, in that role, both independently of their own type shall
perform move N with the perturbed probability (1-e) and move T with
minimum probability e. The terms in the first brackets of (3.3) and of
(3.4), respectively, coincide. Consider now the last terms of the second
brackets of (3.3) and of (3.4) respectively. According to these terms
which refer to the pay-off in the role of a second mover the m-type fares
better receiving 1 with probability e while the fair m-type shall get
merely r~l with probability e. This implies that the comparative
advantage of the unfair m-type carries over from the realm rp~s into
rp~s. Thus, if move T cannot be excluded with certainty only
populations with a percentage p-0 of fair m-types shall be evolutionarily
stable.
Moreover, a positive minimum probability of move N has no effect if
rp~s prevails. In that case N should be rationally performed with
probability 1 anyway. We can therefore note:
Theorem 3.3: In the evolutionary game of trust with incomplete type
information only an m-monomorphic population with18
p-0 can be evolutionarily stable according to the LESS
concept.
Comparing theorems 3.1 and 3.3 the importance of type information
becomes obvious. While developing a conscience is evolutionarily stable
if players can identify their co-players' types before they play a game of
trust this is no longer true if players merely know the distribution of
types in the entire population. If types cannot identify each other, a first
mover cannot expect that trust shall be met with fair retriburion by the
second mover. The disposition to develop a conscience that is
sufficiently strong to motivate fair behavior shall not succeed in
evolution. Only the inclination to behave unfairly in interactions that
have the incentive structure of the game of trust shall be evolutionarily
stable.
The foregoing arguments were related to pure, ideal or extreme cases. As
such they give us some handles on what might have been crucial factors
of the evolutionary process in which our own species emerged.
Nevertheless it seems quite unlikely that the ideal conditions of the two
polar cases could have prevailed during human evolution. It seems
much more plausible that these conditions as a matter of fact can be
characterized by "intermediate" informational assumptions that locate
the interaction between the two extreme cases studied so far. To an
analysis of such an intermediate case we shall turn now.
3.3. The game of trust with some type infonmation
In the real world information is a valuable commodity. Situations that
have the structure of the game of trust illustrate this general observation
in a particularly interesting way. For, in such situations the availability
of information about the trustworthiness of second movers is crucial.
Since r~s, first as well as second movers should be willing to invest in
costly information technologies. First movers independently of their own19
type would like to detect the type of the second mover while
trustworthy second movers would like to signal their own type. As the
comparison of the two polar cases analyzed before shows, it would be in
the common interest of the first and the trustworthy second mover if the
type of the second mover could be made common knowledge by some
signal.
However, a second mover without a conscience has an incentive to
engage in mimicry and this in turn puts a threat on the reliability of
signaling and detection technologies. Since we cannot dwell on the
biological aspects of this and related issues here we shall simply assume
that a reliable detection technology is available at a cost. Individuals can
make a strategic decision whether or not they shall invest in that costly
detection technology before they play the game of trust.
These investment decisions determine the information conditions that
prevail in the game of trust. If both invest the type of both players shall
be common knowledge and the game of trust with complete type
information shall be played. If none invests merely the distribution of
types in the population shall be common knowledge and the game of
trust shall be played without any specific type information. If exactly one
individual invests which of the games is played depends. If the investing
individual ends up as a first mover the emerging game of trust shall
have basically the same strategic properties as the game with complete
type information. If the investor plays as a second mover there will be no
return on the information investment and the emerging game has
basically the same strategic properties as the game of trust without type
information.
3.3.1. The game model
Observe first that independently of information conditions, the second
mover's final decision between E and R shall depend only on her own
type. Irrespective of what the last mover knows about her own type as~~~Ir~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~F ri~~~~~~~~~~~~r~~~~~~~~~~i~~
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Figure 3.5: In this truncated tree it is assumed that the second mover chooses optimally according to his type after 'T'. After a player
has chosen y the cost C must still be subtracted from all payoffs of that player at the mrresponding endnodes. The information sets
aze indicated by braíds. The last line, showing whether 'T' or 'N" was chosen by the first mover, as well as the vertical lines separa-
ting "packs" of four payoff vectors each were included for the convenience of the reader.20
well as about the first mover's type and moves a last mover of type m
shall rationally choose R while her m-type prefers E. Thus without
changing essential strategic elements of the game, we can substitute the
final decisions of the second mover by the payoff vectors resulting from
rational play and we can present the game by a truncated variant of its
tree (see figure 3.5).
figure 3.5 about here
Again the game starts with a fictitious initial chance move. In this move
the chance player 0 selects both players' types. Independently of each
other with probability p the m-type and with complementary probability
(1-p) the fn-type aze chosen (where p is the proportion of m-types in the
population). Then players must decide whether they shall invest, y, or
not invest, n, into the detection technology. Both can invest at the same
cost "C". They must make that decision before the roles of a first or of a
second mover are assigned to them. When they make their decisions
they are ignorant not only of the other player's type but also of the
other's investment decision. For every constellation of m-types and
players' investments into detection technologies players are then
assigned to their roles as first and second mover with probability 1~2 by
an unbiased chance move. Finally under the given constellation a variant
of the game of trust is played resulting in payoffs modified by the
constant C. CI'he payoffs of the truncated tree of figure 3.5 must still be
modified by subtracting the investment costs C of any player who chose
y. We left this out because otherwise the game tree might have become
virtually unreadable.)
According to the information sets of figure 3.5 the players' decisions
between y and n remain private information. Since in the basic game of
trust the information technology can be useful only for the player who
moves first this is not crucial. The first mover's optimal decision does
not depend on the information status of the second mover while thezi
second mover would not care anyway. Thus, it would not change the
strategic character of the game in any essential way if investment
decisions could be observed or were anounced beforehand. More
restrictive is the assumption that the information technology is perfectly
reliable. After investment the investing player knows the other player's
type. The costs may be too high to make the investment worthwhile.
However, if the costs of the technology are borne it works perfectly
reliable. For instance, if both have invested in detection technology the
game under perfect type information shall emerge (though all payoffs in
the basic game of trust that is reached after these investment decisions
are diminished by a constant C).
3.3.2. The game of trust with incomplete type infonmation if a perfect
detection technology is available at a cost
Taking into account what has been said before about the strategic
situation of second movers we may focus first on the decision of an
individual who, with probability 1 ~2, ends up as a first mover. Assume
that the first mover had chosen y. He then gets to know the m-type of
his co-player. Therefore, if the co-player is of type m he will choose T
whereas facing an in-type opponent he will play N. Had he chosen n
instead of y the first player's decisions would depend on his a priori
beliefs in the following way: He would prefer T if rp~s and N if rp~s.
The payoff implications of n depend on whether rp~s or rp~s holds
good. Therefore we will distinguish between these two cases when
analyzing the optimality of investment decisions for players who do not
yet know whether with probability 1 ~2 they shall play as first movers or
with equal probability shall be in the position of a second mover.
Case rp~s: In this case a player who chooses n and then -- with
probability 1 ~2 - must move first, on behalf of his a priori beliefs shall
opt for T. Clearly, if -- with probability p-- the opponent is of the m-type, the choice of n(except for C) shall yield the same payoff
expectation as that of y. For, against an m-type opponent, T would be
optimal after y as well. If, on the other hand, the opponent -- with
probability 1-p -- is of type m choosing y will yield s whereas 0 accrues
after the choice of n. Choosing y enhances the payoff expectation only
when playing the basic game of trust as a first mover. Since this applies
with probability 1~2 while the detection technology is useless if the
player ends up as a second mover the expected advantage of y over n is
2(1-p)s which must be compazed with the cost C. We note
Lemma 3.1: For rp~s the choice of y is optimal for (1-p) 2 ~ C whereas n
is better if (1-p) 2 ~C.
Case rp~s: In this case a player who chooses n and then -- with
probability 1 ~2 -- must move first shall opt for N on behalf of his a priori
beliefs. If he encounters an m-type opponent -- which happens with
probability (1-p) -- the payoff expectations after y and n(dísregarding C)
shall be equal. Then knowledge of the other player's type shall not alter
the first mover's choice. If, on the other hand, the opponent is an m-type
-- an event pending with probability p-- the return on a positive
investment decision y(at cost C) shall be r whereas the payoff accruing
to the choice of n shall merely amount to s. We note
Lemma 3.2: For rp~s the choice of y is optimal for (r-s) 2 ~ C whereas n
is better if (r-s) 2 ~C.
Lemmas 1 and 2 jointly with our previous results determine a solution of
the detection model of the truncated game tree of figure 3.5 for all
generic parameter constellations that exclude indifference along the
solution path. Thismay be summarized in23
Theorem 3.4: Except for degenerate cases in which at least one player is
indifferent between alternative moves along the solution
path the detection model characterized by the truncated
game tree of figure 3.5 has a unique solution according to
which
(i) in the basic game of trust a second mover who is of type
m chooses E while in that role the m-type prefers R,
(ii) in the basic game of trust a first mover who has made
the positive investment decision y knows the second
player's type and therefore chooses T if her co-player is
of type m and N otherwise,
(iii) in the basic game of trust a first mover who has made
the negative investment decision n chooses T if rp~s
while preferring N if rp~s,
(iv) the optimal investment decision of both players is y if
rp~s and (1-p) 2 ~ C
or
rp~s and (r-s) p ~ C
whereas the optimal investment decision of both
players is n if
rp~s and (1-p) 2 ~C
or
rp~s and (r-s) p ~C.
Theorem 3.4 deals merely with non-degenerate cases. Degenerate cases
emerge whenever one of the players is indifferent between two moves.
Given optimal play this may happen only for highly special parameter24
constellations, namely rp-s, p-s-SC, and p-(TS). It shall become obvious
in the next section that except for p-s-SC these values of p refer merely
to transitory states of evolutionary dynamics and thus are irrelevant for
the determination of the evolutionary stable population composition.
3.3.3. The evolutionary game of trust with incomplete type informa-
tion if a perfect detection technology is available at a cost
Before turning to the issue of evolutionary stability itself it seems helpful
to take a somewhat closer look at the relationships between the cost C of
the detection technology and the solution behavior. Because of pe [0, 1]
and r~s~0 the expected gains from investment (1-p~, in case rp~s, and
(r-s~ , in case rp~s, are both smaller than 2. Thus for C? 2 the negative
investment decision n is optimal in any case.
Taking into account theorem 3.4 (iv) a more stringent condition can be
derived. For Ce (0, 2) the highest possible gain from detection is (1-i) 2
-(r-s) T2. It is achieved for p-r; i. e. when a player who is assigned the
role of a first mover in the basic game of trust is indifferent between T
and N. From this we can infer that n is optimal if C2(1-r). Since
1~r~s~0 implies ~ 2(1r) this condition is indeed more stringent than
the one derived before.25
~(C') s~r p(C') 1
Figure 3.6
Within the range 2(1- r)~C~O the result depends on the population
composition p as illustrated in figure 3.6 for the value C'. For all p with
~(C')~p~p(C') expected gains from a positive investment decision y
exceed their costs C' whereas for any p outside that range the opposite
holds. Thus investing in detection technology is worthwhile if for C-C'
the population composition complies with ,Q(C')~p~p(C') where p(C')
and p(C') are determined by
p(C')-rS and p(C')-s-SC .
More generally we can state for all cost parameters Ce (0, 2(1- i)) that
the positive investment decision y can be rational only if the population
compostion p complies with
p(C)-T S~ p ~ p(C)-s SC.
For all Ce (0, 2(1- i)) we can finally infer -- cf. also figure 3.6 -
P
0~~(C)~p(C)~1.26
Keeping in mind these preliminary observations about the relationships
between the costs of the detection technology, the population
composition and optimal investment behavior we can now approach the
problem of evolutionary stability. As before we shall only consider the
mutant space M-(m,m} with m~r-1~ m where we can and shall rely on
our previous results whenever suitable.
According to part (iv) of theorem 3.4 the optimal investment decision
dces not depend at all on the investing player's type. This is intuitively
plausible. Cm the one hand, the faculty to detect the other player's type
is for first movers of both types of the same value while their optimal
choice dces not depend on their own type. On the other hand, though
the optimal decisions of second movers are type dependent the detection
technology is useless for them. Therefore the probability of choosing y is
determined by considerations that are identical for both types. We shall
refer to this type independent probability of choosing y by xE [0,1].
Consider first of all prohibitively high values C ~ 2(1- i). Then x-0 will
hold good. Knowledge of m-types is strictly private and a priori beliefs
are determined by the true population composition p. Players shall only
know their own m-type and the distribution of m-types in the entire
population. Therefore theorem 3.3 directly applies. The population share
p of ~-types converges to p-0. The evolutionarily stable population
composition does not contain trustworthy individuals. Conscience
cannot survive.
Lemma 3.3: In the evolutionary game of trust with perfect but costly
detection technology only an m-monomorphic popu-
lation with p-0 can be evolutionarily stable according to
the LESS concept if C ~2 (1- i). In such a population no
one invests in detection technology.
For cost parameters CE (0, 2(1-i)) considerations become more compli-
cated. Whether or not the costly detection technology will be used andwhether or not the evolutionarily stable population composition will
contain m-types then depends: Whereas investing in detection
technology is optimal if pE (p(C), p(C)), choosing n is optimal for
p~ (p(C), p(C)).
Since O~p(C)~p(C)~1 we know that monomorphic population
compositions fall outside that range. We can therefore note two simple
lemmas.
Lemma 3.4: In the evolutionary game of trust with perfect but costly
detection technology an m-monomorphic population with
p-0 will always be evolutionarily stable according to the
LESS concept if C~O. In such a population no one invests
in detection technology.
Proof: In case of p-0 the gain of using the detection technology shall be
zero (cf. again figure 3.6). Because of C~0 we therefore can infer that x-0
and the situation with no investment in detection technology prevails.
Therefore lemma 3.4 follows from theorem 3.3 :.
Thus, due to C~0 and (r-s) p 2-~ 0 for p~0 the m-monomorphic
population with p-0 shall always be evolutionarily stable according to
the LESS concept. However, the other possible monomorphic
population, the m-monomorphic one with p-1 is never evolutionarily
stable.
Lemma 3.5: In the evolutionary game of trust with perfect but costly
detection technology an m-monomorphic population with
p-1 can never be evolutionarily stable according to the
LESS concept if C~O.
Proof: If p-1 nothing can be gained by using the detection technology.
Because of C~0 we therefore can infer that x-0. Thus lemma 3.5 again
follows from theorem 3.3 :.
Turning to other population compositions p observe first that O~C~2(1-
r)) and p~ [p(C),p(C)] implies x-0 and thus a decrease in p. This shows2s
that no population composition p can be evolutionarily stable under
these premises. It remains to be investigated whether population
compositions pE [~(C), p(C)] can be evolutionarily stable if the detection
technology is costly but not prohibitively so.
The interval [~(C), p(C)] is non-empty for Ce (0, 2(1- i)). From the
argument illustrated in figure 3.6 one can infer that x-1 if pE (p(C), p(C)).
In that case the m-types shall be common knowledge when the basic
game of trust is played and theorem 3.1 implies that p approaches 1.
Again refering to figure 3.6 it is obvious that the increase of p has to stop
at p-p(C). For, beyond 'p(C) nobody invests in detection technology
anymore. For p~p(C) type information will be private when the basic
game of trust is played and the reproductive success of m-types shall
exceed that of m- types. Switching from x-1 for pE (p(C), p(C)) to x-0 for
p~p(C) stabilizes the population composition at p-p(C). This proves
Lemma 3.6: For Ce (0, 2(1- T)) a population composition p with a share
p-p(C)-s-SC
of m-individuals is evolutionarily stable.
The other boundary p(C) of the interval [~(C), p(C)] does not satisfy the
conditions for this kind of evolutionary stability. Since x-0 for p~p(C)
implies that p decreases and x-1 for p(C)~p~(C) induces an increase of
p-- where 0~~(C)~p(C)~1 due to O~C~ 2(1- T) and O~s~r -- the
population composition p-p(C)-(rS) is highly unstable. Any slight
disturbance of p will lead away from p-p(C).
Our discussion of the evolutionary game of trust with incomplete type
information if a perfect detection technology is available at a cost C may
be summarized now in29
Theorem 3.5: The evolutionary stability of population compositions cha-
racterized by the share p of m-individuals depends on the
costs C of the detection technology as follows:
(i) for C? 2(1- r) the only evolutionarily stable
population is the m-monomorphic one characterized
by p-0;
(ii) for O~C~ 2(1- r) there aze two evolutionarily stable
populations characterized either by p-0 or
s-2C
p-p(C)- s ;
(iii) for C-0 the only evolutionazily stable population is
the m-monomorphic one characterized by p-1.
Proof: For C~2 (1- i) part (i) merely restates lemma 3.3. If C-2 (1- r) the
interval [~(C), p(C)], though non-empty still, contains only one point,
namely p-T. Then y is at most as good as n but definitely not better than
n. Assume, nevertheless, x-1 for pr. Since x-0 for all p~i one can
hardly imagine a dynamic process in which the parameter p as a
s
function of time t with p-p(t) stabilizes at p-i. Note in pazticular that
x-0 is as plausible as x-1 for pr. Therefore one should expect that only
p-0 is evolutionarily stable for C-~ (1- T). (ii) follows from lemmas 3.4
and 3.6. (iii) restates theorem 3.1:.
4. Discussion
We are not living in a morally perfect world in which trust finds its fair
reward whenever shown and exploitative behavior isunknown. Quite to
the contrary we know that the human faculty to make forward looking30
opportunistic choices renders precarious or even impossible many forms
of mutually advantageous co-operation. The general line of the
preceding argument may give us some first clues for a somewhat deeper
understanding of why this is so. At the same time it draws attention to
circumstances under which a conscience and retributive emotions may
serve in evolutionarily stable ways as a potential remedy for certain
problems of co-operation in a"competitive world".
Admittedly these as well as the following observations have a distinctly
speculative flavor. On the other hand they are not "mere" speculations
but speculations guided by models. Besides running experiments and
testing models against statistical evidence such kinds of guided
speculation are definitely a legitimate part of social science research or
more traditionally speaking of "moral science". So let us finally on the
basis of our models engage in some partly speculative moral science
discussion.
Immanuel Kant in a strange combination of Latin and Greek terms spoke
of the "homo noumenon" and the "homo phí3nomenon" (cf. 1798~1991, ~
49, E., 158). He argued that moral duties like those of promise keeping
must hold without exception. They have a legitimate claim on us
"whatever the consequences". If one can swallow this idea of a noumenal
world (noumenale Welt) or a world of reason in which action stems from
reason itself this may not be without some plausibility. On the other
hand we more pedestrian fellows are not living in the world of reason.
And as "worldly philosophers" (cf. Heilbroner"s well known book title
1953~83) we have a natural inclination to believe that men in general are
pursuing their worldly aims rather than following the precepts of
Kantian reason. Phenomena like emotions and passions form the springs
of actions. They determine human preferences which in turn determine
the course of human affairs.
Still, even such a world could be morally perfect if individuals would all
the time be guided by the "right" moral emotions. In particular the
individuals' conscience could conceivably induce compliance with moral
norms of fairness in each instance. Because of this preference31
modification the individually rational and the moral choice could
coincide throughout.
Insights like lemma 3.5 may count as evidence against such dreams of a
pre-stabilized moral harmony. Though forbearing from exploitation may
comply with the precepts of Kantian reason the emotional disposition to
act that way shall not be evolutionarily stable if information is costly. On
the other hand, theorem 3.5 provides some more realistic hope that the
world though definitely not inhabited exclusively by saints may neither
be the playground of a population of devils. If the cost C of the detection
technology is not prohibitively high there exists a stable mixed
population composition with a share p~(C) of fair m-individuals which
is positive but smaller than 1.
Whereas part (i) and (iii) of theorem 3.5 are merely restating previous
results in the more general framework of the detection model, part (ii)
adds a new insight since it points out that under certain values of the
parameters different stable population compositions are viable. To us
this part of the theorem seems rather convincing. Restating Robert
Frank's informal modern version of a"theory of moral sentiments" (cf.
1988, chap. 3, and of course Smith 1759~1966) in more precise terms of
evolutionary game theory it predicts that fair individuals will be driven
out of a population whenever the share of m-type individuals falls below
a certain threshold p-~(C). If the population share p of m-types exceeds
p(C) the fair types can survive but cannot eliminate unfair types beyond
p-p(C)~l.
Moreover, a somewhat closer look at the expressions defining the
relevant thresholds of p leads to intuitively plausible results. Starting
with the expression p-p(C)-(rS) we immediately observe that the
requirement necessary for the evolutionarily stable survival of m-types
becomes more severe if (r-s)-~0. This makes good sense since, then,
bearing the risk of being exploited becomes less worthwhile. Quite
analogous considerations apply as far as the growth of C in this term is
concerned.32
The other threshold p-p(C)-s-SC is more interesting since it refers to the
evolutionarily stable composition of the mixed population containing
both types. The p-p(C) population seems to be quite in line with our
experience: There are always some people whom we can trust and some
who cannot be trusted; some shall exploit us if we fail to recognize them
while others will be fair even though we may also fail to recognize them
beforehand.
Theorem 3.5 (ii) justifies at least some optimism that some trustful co-
operation can survive once fair types have somehow gained a sufficient
share ~(C) in a population. This seems to presuppose information
conditions under which information costs are sufficiently close to zero.
From this point of view it is certainly no surprise that in their original
adaptation humans lived in small closely knit societies in which
information on each others' behavior is available virtually costless most
of the time. That privacy is alien to primitive people may be counted as
supporting evidence (cf. also Posner 1981, chap. 6). It may also be
observed that virtually all ordered large group interaction is ordered by
a skeleton of small groups in which individuals know each other quite
well and can eliminate unfair types from the group once in a while (for
example the managers of a large company organizing their and other
company members' business in hierarchies of small groups may exclude
unfair types).
Besides reducing information costs small group organization has several
other aspects. Still the aspect of reducing these costs is important. In the
real world we often take some effort to reduce C by means of small
group organization. It fits in nicely that in our model
p(C)-s-SC
approaches 1 if C~O.
In view of lemma 3.5 theorem 3.1 seems to be a highly special result. If
our other assumptions apply an m-monomorphic population can be
evolutionarily stable only if a perfect detection technology is available33
for free and thus the condition (1-p) 2? C is trivially satisfied. On the
other hand, looking at the next figure 3.7 we may also regard theorem
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Figure 3.7
T'he graph summarizes the basic insights of theorem 3.5 in the p,C-plane.
Solving p(C)-s-SC for C we get for each composition p the highest
investment C-(1-p) 2 in detection technology rational individuals
would bear. Obviously with increasing p costs must be lower or with
decreasing costs a higher share p of m-types can be stabilized. T'he
limiting case C-0 is special in the interval beyond p-s~r only insofar as
merely one populaHon can be evolutionarily stable then, namely p-1.
For each value of C our analysis determines the evolutionarily stable
states, namely either p-0 or p-0 and p-p(C), for C~2 (1- r). For any
initial value poE [0, 1] it also provides a clue to which of the two
composition pazameters p will converge. As indicated by the arrows in
figure 3.8 the share p of fair types increases inside the triangle formed by
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The region {(p, C): p(C)~p51, 05Cr (1- T) }
forms the attraction set of p-p(C)-s-SC for oSC~ 2(1- i) while the
region that is complementary to the triangle in figure 3.8 forms the
source of p-0 (disregarding degenerate cases with a starting point
po-p(C) and OcCc 2(1- i)).
According to figure 3.8 the starting point of the dynamic process is
s s
essential. If O~C~ 2(1- T) it depends on the starting point poe [0, 1]
whether the population composition will converge to p-0 or to p-p(C).
Both is possible. If it so happens that we have a"good start" there will be
a more or less happy ending if not so not. Since we are talking about
biological evolution it does not seem that we can do much about it.
On the other hand, biological evolution shall be influenced by social or
cultural evolution in what is basically a co-evolutionary process (cf. on
this Lumsden and Wilson 1981, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). And,
though we cannot directly change our human nature we can do
something about social conditions and constraints under which it35
operates (cf. on this already Hume 1751~1978, in particular book III, part
II, sec. vii). In particular we can influence whether we are living and
interacting most of the time in small closely knit groups like the family
and stable (typically culturally homogeneous) social networks in which
m-types may be expected to be common knowledge or whether we
interact more frequently in large anonymous groups. It seems that while
the former conditions will stabilize the share p of fair m-types in a
population the latter will work in the opposite direction. We therefore
should be aware that even in the modern world it may be necessary to
stick to some aspects of the social organization that prevailed during the
our original hunter gatherer adaption for otherwise evolution might in
the long run drive out those moral emotions that make social
organization viable in the first place.
A morally perfect world in which people trust each other and in which
their trust in all likelihood is met by spontaneous acts of fair reward can
be approached as closely as we wish to if we can manage to reduce C. It
should also be observed, however, that reducing C may come at an extra
cost. For, obviously, whatever may be done to reduce C may not be in
line with the fundamental ideals of privacy in a liberal society.
Moreover, according to the common wisdom of economists "there is no
such thing like a free lunch" and neither is there a free detection
technology. Therefore we must in general assume C~O. But, then, p-1
implies x-0. Thus a mutantm entering an m-monomorphic population
will be successful. In the role of second mover the mutant achieves a
reproductive success of
1 1 1 1
2rt 21- 2}2r
whereas the reproductive success of m-types related to that role is only
r~2 since trustful and trustworthy first movers in the game of trust fall
prey to second mover exploitation but never exploit first movers.
An m-monomorphic population is not evolutionarily stable unless
information about the other's type is available at no cost. Since the latter
is unrealistic we can end with a kind of inversion of Abraham Lincolns36
famous exclamation that one can fool all people sometimes and some
people all the time but hazdly all people all the time: One can trust all
people sometimes, and some people all the time but it would be foolish
to trust all people all the time.37
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